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Abstract 15 
Since two decades ago, when China’s economic strength has made this most populated country 16 
as a leading global agricultural outsourcer, there have increasingly been hot debates on whether 17 
such outsourcing is destructive or constructive, especially for host countries. Some critics 18 
pessimistically call it ‘land grabs’ or ‘neo-colonialism’ that should be prevented while others 19 
optimistically appreciate it as a development opportunity that should be promoted. The first 20 
group interprets the outsourcing as a win-loss process while the second considers it as a win-win 21 
deal. This study tries to show the possible gains and losses of both outsourcers and host 22 
countries. Accordingly, this paper introduces four different situations; i.e. loss-loss; win-loss; 23 
loss-win; and win-win. The first situation is understood as a ‘red-deal’ which should urgently be 24 
stopped. The second and third situations are called ‘yellow-deal’ which should be adjusted to 25 
come up with the last situation which we call ‘green-deal’ that addresses the benefits of both 26 
outsourcers and outsourcees. The paper concludes that in order to understand the main impacts 27 
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of such deals, we still need to create more evidence for each situation in the framework of a 28 
series of risk assessment studies on the bases of both “country-case” and “crop-case”. 29 
Keywords: land deal, land grab, neo-colonialism, agricultural investment, agricultural 30 
development.31 
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1. Introduction 32 
A secure and sustainable food production system is needed for surviving human being societies. 33 
The world is making only slow progress in reducing food insecurity, according to the Global 34 
Hunger Index (GHI)2 (Ackello-Ogutu, 2011). Some regions—in particular South and Southeast 35 
Asia, the Near East and North Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean—have made 36 
significant headway in combating hunger and malnutrition since 1990, but in South Asia and 37 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the GHI still remains high (Grebmer et al., 2008). While one billion people 38 
currently suffer from hunger (UN, 2009), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2009a) 39 
of the United Nations estimates that by 2050, the world’s population will exceed 9 billion,  most 40 
of which will be inhabitants of the developing world.  41 
At the same time, the majority of the world’s remaining cultivatable land lies in developing 42 
countries (Cotula et al., 2009). Many large land areas in the developing world are in fact 43 
cultivated by indigenous communities, but return very low yields. This limits the capacity of the 44 
developing world to meet the world’s demands without outside investment (Hallam, 2009). Most 45 
of Sub-Saharan African nations suffer from food insecurity. Among all, according to the latest 46 
GHI scores (in 2011), three countries3 stay at “extremely alarming” and 13 countries4 at 47 
“alarming” mode (Wünsche, 2011). Consequently, it seems that they need a great help to 48 
produce enough food for their own and also other countries with insufficient cultivable land. Yet, 49 
the food and fuel scarcities push some countries, especially capital-rich and natural resources-50 
poor nations like China, South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (STWR, 2012) to buy or 51 
lease huge quantities of foreign lands mainly for the production of food and biofuels for 52 
domestic consumption (Haralambous, 2009).  53 
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Since about 95 percent of Asia’s croplands have already been used, Africa and Latin America 54 
are seen as the most likely places where foreign investors will seek arable land (Kersting, 2011). 55 
The cheap and abundant farmlands in developing nations, particularly in Africa, drive capital 56 
rich nations to outsource their food productions (Cotula et al., 2009). Among agricultural 57 
outsourcing (AO) scramblers, some of the most populated countries; i.e. China and India, have 58 
put serious attempts to drive global AO due to domestic shortages in land, energy and natural 59 
resources (Friis and Reenberg, 2010). Yet, the scarcity of land and sprawling overpopulation in 60 
those countries have led to political backlashes that prompted the central government to turn its 61 
attention to Africa at the beginning of this decade to fill its people’s rice bowl (Horta, 2009). 62 
Since the 1990s, in order to accommodate the food and energy growing demand, China, the most 63 
populated country in the world, has come into this picture as the main feature. In Latin America, 64 
overall Chinese direct investments have been small but on rise. Currently, China’s interest in this 65 
region has focused on oil and metals, not agriculture (Davies, 2009). By 2011, 26 Chinese 66 
companies have been actively in negotiation with Latin American and African countries 67 
especially Argentina, Brazil, Mozambique, Nigeria, Angola, Malawi, Sudan, Ethiopia, 68 
Madagascar and Zimbabwe to invest on agriculture, food, forestry, fishery and biofuels 69 
(Saturnino et al., 2011; Afripol, 2010; Cobo et al., 2011).   70 
Much of the AO is taking place in developing countries with weaker governance and less 71 
developed civil societies (Grindle, 2002). Among others, the most AO is taking place in Africa. 72 
Although foreign nationalities have been engaged in agriculture in this continent for many years, 73 
the scale of such deals has increased significantly in recent years. Consequently, the contentious 74 
issue of ‘land grabbing’ has become the subject of numerous media reports since the global food 75 
crisis worsened in 2008 (FIAN, 2012). The latest wave of land grabbing began towards the end 76 
5 
 
of 2008 when the global food crisis generated a serious concern over supplies in countries that 77 
consume more food than what they produce (STWR, 2012).  78 
Across Africa, governments are already leasing large areas of land that are traditionally used 79 
by small-scale farmers to transnational companies for industrial agriculture or for planting trees 80 
as carbon sinks so as to gain carbon credits. Pearce (2011) asks whether such a lease will 81 
accelerate if the soil itself becomes a carbon commodity. According to him, the high costs of 82 
employing scientists, consultants, and practitioners to monitor the carbon uptake of farm soils 83 
will make it unfeasible for poor farmers to pocket any income from the sale of the carbon 84 
absorbed by their soils. He believes that only rich farmers are able to lessen these transactions 85 
costs significantly to profit from the carbon markets. Consequently, a new phase of land 86 
grabbing—called “soil grabbing” is taking place in this continent.  87 
Another essential issue is that the desire to use water resources is embedded in many land 88 
deals (Woodhouse and Ganho 2011; Skinner and Cotula, 2011). In many cases water itself is the 89 
target of deals, not only for agricultural purposes but also for other purposes like mining which 90 
could result in “water grabbing” (Mehta et al., 2012).  91 
Concurring with the liberalisation of trade, competition for AO is more and more played out 92 
directly between local land users, national economic elites, and transnational investors (Oxfam, 93 
2009). As a result, land acquisitions are on the increase in Africa and other continents, raising the 94 
risk or opportunity that poor people will be evicted or lose access to land, water, and other 95 
resources, if not made properly (FAO, 2009b), or gain some benefits to promote their socio-96 
economic and ecological services and facilities. Correspondingly, some believe that AO has 97 
generated some envisage economic opportunities for local communities while others see it as a 98 
serious threat to the livelihoods of local poor people (Friis and Reenberg, 2010; Madebo, 2011; 99 
Smaller and Mann, 2009; Ezra, 2010; Mihretie, 2010; Smith, 2010; Grau and Aide, 2008).  
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Although indicative evidence has started to emerge, there is yet very little systematic 101 
monitoring of these trends, research into the impacts, or exploration of the opportunities that may 102 
be created for rural development. These trends pose both a threat and an opportunity to the rural 103 
poor, who are increasingly losing their land rights and the future food production security. 104 
Particularly, dispossession is likely to occur where their land tenure rights are weak and 105 
unrecognized. Most at risk are groups such as women, pastoralists, indigenous people and others 106 
dependent on customary and common-pool resource rights that are insecure and undocumented 107 
(Quan, 2006). The vulnerability of these groups is often compounded by corruption that can 108 
accompany large-scale land transfers. There is already evidence of the displacement of poor 109 
resource-users by agro-fuels production, while others may lose access to resources, such as 110 
rangelands and forests, which may constitute an important safety net and livelihood source for 111 
marginalized groups. However, where poor people have secure land use rights, these trends may 112 
actually offer opportunities for development. 113 
Hence, the question surfaces whether AO has an entirely negative impact as critics posit, or 114 
whether it might also carry some potential benefits. Furthermore, there remain some other crucial 115 
questions as follows: what are the main subsequent of global AO? Are the consequences 116 
destructive or constructive and for whom? Will the AO be a win-win or a win-loss deal? And 117 
what are the main gains and losses of such deals? 118 
 119 
2. A two-headed coin: win or loss? 120 
AO can be considered as a two-headed coin since it can lead to win and/or loss. It is clear that 121 
investors and investees both expect to win the most and loss the least. Undoubtedly, the investors 122 
come to developing countries to earn something, i.e. food and energy security. But the big 123 
question is that what they would bring to the host (mostly poor) countries. It is essential to 124 
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regulate the conditions that can direct AO to win for both sides of the deal. However, apparently, 125 
as a consequence of investors’ power and investees’ weakness, the most so far AOs have led to 126 
win for the guest and loss for the host countries. AO must reduce, and not expand, the number of 127 
hungers and communities that struggle to survive. Leaseholders might push the host 128 
governments for better tax situations for farmers, while host countries could insist on the local 129 
hiring. Some empirical studies of the past few years clearly indicated that foreign investment 130 
companies are profiting from “land grab”, and AO in developing countries has failed to deliver 131 
its promise of jobs, infrastructure, schools, and health facilities (Madebo, 2011). Large land deals 132 
also carry big risks. Local people can end up with losing the land, water and other resources that 133 
have supported their livelihoods for generations, while the jobs created in return may be few, 134 
short-lived and low-paid (Cotula, 2011). Cotula (2012) believes that the global “land grab” 135 
reflects profound economic and social transformations in agriculture and if it sustained over the 136 
next few years, will have profound implications for the future of world agriculture. Yet, some 137 
organisations think this could be a chance for poor countries to trade land and labour for the 138 
technology and investment vital for developing their own food and energy production systems 139 
and should not generally be condemned (Mackenzie, 2008).  140 
One of the main opportunities for the host countries is that the investors need to import a 141 
portion of their own technologies to produce crop and construct the needed or promised 142 
infrastructures to reach a successful production or goods transportation. For instance, they import 143 
farm machines, equipments and irrigation systems (Grain, 2009). Also, they would set up 144 
warehouses and buildings to repair and maintain farm machines and irrigation systems. 145 
Additionally, proper roads and railways must be constructed to export products and import all 146 
needed things like farm machines and equipments, irrigation systems, chemicals, fertilizers and 147 
seeds (UN, 2007; Meentzen, 2010; Ullenberg, 2009). As seen, constructing some infrastructures 148 
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can facilitate the host countries to approach development. However, the contribution of local 149 
people is essential to learn how to build such infrastructures. If investors fairly allow local people 150 
to participate in establishing infrastructures and train them, at least a portion of successful 151 
technology transfer becomes guaranteed (Maskus, 2004). Such a situation can surely be expected 152 
as a development opportunity for host countries and considered as a win-win deal.  153 
Nations must understand the motivations of foreign investors in farmland acquisition. Most 154 
investors are leasing land in Africa because they suffer already from some irreversibly depleted 155 
natural resource stocks in their home nations (Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen, 2010). If the 156 
deals are properly regulated, genuine agricultural investments by operators with a strong track 157 
record can create opportunities for recipient countries and local people, bringing capital, know-158 
how, jobs, market access and infrastructure development (Kugelman and Levenstein, 2009). To 159 
make a properly regulated deal, political, socio-economic and environmental aspects with respect 160 
to local conditions especially in the host countries should be considered. Otherwise, there may be 161 
severe environmental, economic, political and social losses for investees. Thus, it is very crucial 162 
to realize which deals can be seen as “land grabbing” and in what conditions it can cruelly be 163 
“land grabbing” or friendly be a “development opportunity”. Accordingly, this paper discusses 164 
that AO could be a “two-headed coin” and has some win and losses for both sides (investor and 165 
investee). Therefore, one can expected four different statuses for the host and guest countries as 166 
shown in Fig. 1. The statuses are discussed in the following. 167 
[insert Fig. 1] 168 
 169 
2.1. Loss-Loss: red deals (destructive; should be stopped) 170 
We start with the worst situation where transnational land deals are destructive for both 171 
outsourcers and outsourcees. We call such loss-loss deals as “red deals” because the deals cause 172 
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some losses to both investors and investees. In such a situation, both the land dealers mostly loss 173 
and hardly gain any benefits. The potential losses for outsourcers are capital, time, and some 174 
possible social conflicts with the local people and political conflicts at the international level 175 
(Songwe and Deininger, 2009). The main losses of the outsourcee could be more severe than the 176 
outsourcer. These losses could be seen from political, socio-economic and environmental points 177 
of view. Internal conflicts and riots against the governmental policies might be the main political 178 
losses in the host countries (Safransky and Wolford, 2011). 179 
The lack of enough job opportunities, no public self-confidence, no suitable land tenure 180 
system and non-secure food production system are the main socio-economic losses in such deals 181 
(Behrman et al., 2011). Unsustainable land tenure system would cause many social conflicts not 182 
only between the outsourcers and outsourcees, but also within the local community (FAO, 2004). 183 
Consequently, an unsustainable food production system (Azadi et al., 2011a) is expected. Hence, 184 
“red deals” are destructive and should be stopped. In other words, such deals can end to an 185 
unsustainable agricultural system and therefore unsustainable development as shown in red color 186 
as a warning color to stop the deals. The unsustainable situation means that the outsourcees’ 187 
agricultural system will be damaged by different drivers mainly caused by the outsourcer. 188 
Destroyed potential agricultural farms and depleted water resources may stop the outsourcees’ 189 
food production system (DEXIA, 2010). Indeed, environmental losses can affect the host 190 
countries in such a way that they can hardly live and survive (Nayak, 2004).   191 
     192 
2.2. Win-Loss: yellow deals (neo-colonialism; should be adjusted) 193 
We call win-loss deals “yellow deals” since these deals may bring some benefits (e.g. 194 
infrastructures, schools or food and biofuel) only for one side. In win-loss deals the investors 195 
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gain and the investees loss. Therefore, these “yellow” deals should be adjusted to reach a win-196 
win situation. 197 
Many commentators warn that investors will grow food in host countries with their own 198 
labours and technologies, and then ship the food back to the guest countries for their local 199 
consumption (Montenegro, 2009). If this habit of selling fertile land continues, there will soon be 200 
no fertile land left for the coming generations. Instead, the future generation will become serfs in 201 
the land of their own country. Such a policy should be adjusted in a way that can bring some 202 
benefits for local people (Ali, 2009). Otherwise, purchasing or long-run leasing farmland in a 203 
region with fertile soils and potential water resources is unsustainable and can easily lead to a 204 
great loss for the host countries. The commentators worry also that the investors will not bring 205 
jobs to investees, and will instead carry land deals to the firms and labourers of guest countries. 206 
Given this stark assessment, many see AO nothing more than a grab for cheap, underutilized 207 
land. Some (e.g. Jacques Diouf, director of the FAO) have gone so far as to specifically label this 208 
type of aggressive land-leasing as “neo-colonialism” (Rubinstein, 2009).  209 
In win-loss deals, the same problems as the loss-loss deals would happen for the host 210 
countries. In this case, the outsourcer’s investments in the outsourcee would cause some gains 211 
for the former and mainly losses for the latter. However, it seems that there is no absolute win for 212 
investors in such situations. For instance, a guest country may gain proper food and biofuel, but 213 
miss its political position in the host country. To raise a secure food production system, what is 214 
worrisome is that the global food production and distribution channel is in the hands of a few 215 
international agribusiness companies with ties to hedge funds. Additionally, the motivation and 216 
role of big agricultural outsourcer like China, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United 217 
Arab Emirates should be evaluated more in details. Also, the consequences of their foreign land 218 
deals especially in main poor AO recipients, i.e. Sudan, Ethiopia, Madagascar and Mozambique 219 
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(Hong, 2011) should be analysed more sensitively. For instance, the role of China, as the largest 220 
global land dealer, needs a more subtle analysis (Smith, 2009) to avoid win-loss deals especially 221 
in the South countries. Without such measures, however, developing countries simply risk to sell 222 
out their resources (Hartwich, 2009). Because if China’s ambitious plans are not carried out with 223 
proper regulations for the environment and its impact on Africa’s agricultural land, the continent 224 
may one day find itself in a similar predicament to the one confronting China today (Horta, 225 
2009). 226 
Amongst the host poor countries, Ethiopia is one of the most reckless countries that denies 227 
ownership of land to its own poor peasants (Azadi et al., 2011b) and sells the nation’s top level 228 
fertile land to foreign investors. In this country, between 2004 and early 2009, farmlands were 229 
bought or leased on an immense scale (1.48 million acres). The country has further approved 815 230 
foreign-financed agricultural projects since 2007 and land is being leased for approximately $1 231 
per year for 2.5 acres (Globalvoices, 2011). Another deal between the Ethiopian government and 232 
the South Korean company Daewoo allowed the firm to export as much as it likes to produce 233 
(Ezra, 2010). Ethiopia is in the midst of a severe food crisis and is heavily dependent on food aid 234 
to feed its people (Hobbelink, 2011). Such aforementioned deals with low income could 235 
exacerbate the poverty in the country and may be ended to much internal riots against local 236 
governments and foreign investors. Another report reveals that Daewoo Logistics was in 237 
negotiation with Malagasy’s government to lease 1.3m hectares of farmland – about half of all 238 
arable land in Madagascar – in 4 coastal regions for 99 years. It planned to produce 500,000 tons 239 
of palm oil in the eastern parts of the country and 4,000,000 tons of corn in the western parts and 240 
export most of the production back to South Korea (Hong, 2011). Such long-run large-scale land 241 
deals may cause the country to a disastrous future seeking for food especially if the investors 242 
export much of their productions and make no job and income for indigenous people.     243 
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An unfair win-loss deal reported by Oxfam (2010) explains that one African delegate, from 244 
Ethiopia, explained how companies have been making quite indecent proposals to his 245 
government to grab their lands for 10 years, for free and no taxes. Ethiopians, in return, earn 246 
nothing else than some of the foods they produced but sold by guests. It seems that such deals 247 
resulted in a new version of the 19th century scramble for Africa (Rudi et al., 2012), a real neo-248 
colonialism. 249 
All these are evident examples of such win-loss deals which we called yellow deals. Most 250 
African economies are heavily reliant on agriculture and natural resources for a significant share 251 
of Gross Domestic Production (GDP), national food needs, employment and export revenue 252 
(Mutangadura, 2007; Rudi et al., 2012). Since, most of the host countries are African with a lot 253 
of poor and hungry people, such win-loss deals are considered as the “land grabs” (Saturnino et 254 
al., 2010) and have sparked accusations of neo-colonialism and fears that the practice could 255 
exacerbate the poverty and lead Africans to a catastrophic future. According to the World Bank, 256 
the global land grab is very real and moving along faster and further than what was previously 257 
understood. Therefore, some benevolent regulations are expected to modify “yellow deals” in 258 
such a way that can come up with win-win deals.   259 
 260 
2.3. Loss-Win: yellow deals (aid; should be adjusted) 261 
In loss-win deals the investors would gain nothing, or at least, not as much as they were 262 
expecting while the investees receive infrastructures, new technologies, health centers and so 263 
forth. Similar to win-loss deals, we call loss-win deals “yellow deals” since they may bring some 264 
infrastructures and services for the host countries but no significant wins for the investors. This 265 
status would happen in wide deals with establishing a lot of infrastructures (e.g.) like the “Varun 266 
Agriculture Sarl” (VAS) contract in Madagascar. VAS leased or purchased 232,000 ha to grow 267 
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rice, corn and pulses in 13 different plains in Sofia region, Madagascar (Rowden, 2011). In 268 
exchange for the rights to the land, VAS undertook to establish health centers, schools, training 269 
sites, road infrastructure, drinking water, houses and equipment for security guards in the region 270 
where it is necessary for the project (TopManda, 2009). This deal is based on a contract farming 271 
and hopefully will end to a win-win deal. In addition to obtaining infrastructures, a loss-win deal 272 
would be a great opportunity for the local people to grab and absorb the imported technologies 273 
from guest countries, especially if they contribute to produce crops or set up the infrastructures. 274 
Actually, providing these situations help host (poor) nations produce and establish crops and 275 
infrastructures. Therefore, in spite of the investors’ losses, loss-win deals would bring some 276 
noticeable opportunity to the investees. Although some governmental or private investors help 277 
the poor nations to get developed, most of investors would not simply spoil their capitals or 278 
spend them for nothing else than an aid. Consequently, loss-win deals can be cited as “aid” to 279 
host countries. 280 
 281 
2.4. Win-Win: green deals (constructive; should be promoted) 282 
Despite the potential pitfalls, outsourcers’ investments in outsourcees might have the potential to 283 
significantly promote the agricultural sector of host countries. Unprecedented improvements to 284 
infrastructure, increases in education and available technology, and an influx of invested capital 285 
could bring sustainable solutions to investees’ food troubles (Haralambous, 2009). For instance, 286 
while China may primarily be motivated by its need to meet its rising food demand, the 287 
modernization of the African agricultural sector is also likely to benefit the people of that 288 
continent. For example, Ugandan government thanked China for its support in developing the 289 
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country’s agricultural industry (UGPulse, 2007)5. In Kampala, China is funding projects to 290 
increase awareness of sustainable fishing practices in an effort to ease the over fishing of Lake 291 
Victoria – the source of much of the fish-heavy diet in Uganda (Rubinstein, 2009). After serious 292 
food shortages last year that degenerated into violent riots, the Senegalese government was eager 293 
to attract Chinese investments (Horta, 2009). Nigerian economist; Jonas Chianu looks at China’s 294 
agricultural strategy in Africa as an unprecedented investment in agricultural sectors of many 295 
nations. He believes that trading land rights for overall development is a way forward. Without 296 
the Chinese, under-utilized farmland would remain unproductive, benefiting no one. Chianu 297 
stated that instead of allowing the resources to lie unexploited, it is better to embark on lease 298 
arrangements (Namibian, 2012). China is also promised to share information with the Latin 299 
American farmers, as it has done in Africa, to improve crop productivity. China has therefore 300 
promised to invest billions of dollars in infrastructure in the region, which would improve the 301 
flow of goods to international markets (Ewing, 2009). Accordingly, we called win-win deals 302 
“green deals” because they end to gain for both sides and would hopefully result in sustainable 303 
food production systems though all this must be tracked by a continuous risk assessment study. 304 
Such systems would be much constructive and eradicate hunger and poverty in both host and 305 
guest countries, feeding current and the next generations. A sustainable agri-rural development is 306 
therefore expected especially for host (poor) countries as a consequence of green deals. “Green 307 
grabbing” is another term which refers to the appropriation of land and resources for 308 
environmental ends. Appropriation’ implies the transfer of ownership, use rights and control over 309 
resources that were once publicly or privately owned from the poor into the hands of the 310 
powerful (Fairhead et al., 2012). Seemingly, land appropriation interacts with other forms of 311 
appropriation, financial speculation in commodities, and entry barriers to erode smallholder 312 
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livelihoods (Amanor, 2012). “Green grabbing” could be a “red”, “yellow” or “green” deal based 313 
on who wins and who losses. 314 
As discussed earlier, the investors need to built some infrastructures such as roads and 315 
railways and import some technologies like farm machines and equipments. To get a real win-316 
win deal and sustainable development, investors should allow local people to contribute and 317 
learn how to construct the infrastructures, or how to repair and maintain farm machines and 318 
irrigation systems. Nonetheless, the inherent talent and ability of the local people are essential to 319 
absorb the imported technologies, even if the investors banned them to collaborate. 320 
 321 
3. What should be studied? 322 
Land deals have some small or big aftermaths with regard to political, socio-economic and 323 
environmental issues especially for host countries, and remarkably in the large-scale, long-run 324 
deals. It seems that it is a governmental responsibility to analyze the deals’ consequences and 325 
make a wise decision about dis/agreement. A series of risk assessment studies is needed to 326 
evaluate all political, socio-economic and environmental situations that end to “red”, “yellow” 327 
and “green” deals. Although the FAO suggests some measures to be taken in order to regulate 328 
land acquisitions and guarantee a minimum benefit for investees to reconcile the investors' 329 
interests (Godoy, 2009), blindly signing the deal would result in red and yellow deals that bring 330 
irreversible losses and disastrous future, mostly for host countries. The main essential aspects 331 
from political, socio-economic and environmental points of view to be considered in each deal 332 
are discussed in the following sections. 333 
 334 
335 
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3.1. Political aspects 336 
The main question here could be addressed to whether AO can influence political relations of 337 
guests and host countries. In other words, could AO ameliorate or deteriorate the dealers’ 338 
political relationships? To what extent it could be destructive or constructive? How will be the 339 
status of land tenure systems? Could the dealers already extend their cooperation in other sectors 340 
successfully? Or is it mostly destructive so that the dealers would not promote their cooperation? 341 
Which dealer will gain more bargaining power?  342 
It is essential to find the accurate answer for each question to establish a successful “green 343 
deal”. However, for political aspects, two layers of dis/satisfaction can be expected: one at the 344 
governmental and the other at the public level.  345 
Although countries that lease or sell their land often suffer from weak governing institutions 346 
(Simon, 2009), it seems that some stronger governments inspect the performance of investors 347 
carefully. Consequently, investors and investees can protect their leases with the investor 348 
protection provisions of international trade pacts6. Since securing land rights is central to 349 
ensuring equitable agricultural development (Rota, 2009), farmers’ land tenure rights must 350 
precede land deal negotiations. Furthermore, rights to land are the basis for social relationships 351 
and cultural values, and a source of prestige and often power and political status (FAO, 2002). 352 
Purchasing or long-term leasing of fertile land would result in dissatisfactions and even 353 
internal riots in host countries. The deals frequently set one group against another in host 354 
countries and the question is how those conflicts get resolved7. For instance, Peru’s government 355 
used deadly force against indigenous people that protested petrochemical and logging interests’ 356 
access to traditional land (Simon, 2009). In Madagascar, the South Korea's Daewoo wanted to 357 
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secure 1.3 million hectares to grow corn, but the deal collapsed for political reasons (Smith, 358 
2009). Such actions show that purchasing or long-term investments on a desired region are not 359 
reasonable, because in cases like riots or even revolutions investors’ rights cannot be guaranteed. 360 
Therefore, as the aftermath of such deals the “red” end, from political point of view, is expected. 361 
However, respecting customary rights, sharing benefits among locals and increasing 362 
transparency (current deals are shrouded in secrecy) would terminate the conflicts.  363 
At last but not least, since investors purchase or lease the potential lands (e.g., those with 364 
irrigation potential or closer to markets) (Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009), from a 365 
pessimistically point of view, selling fertile land continuously may lead to a serious threat to host 366 
countries’ independency and territorial integrity. 367 
 368 
3.2. Socio-economic aspects 369 
The main social issues here are food security, displacement of indigenous people, loss of income 370 
opportunities, social inequities, and conflicts. The main concern here would be the current and 371 
future situation of small-scale farmers. Are their conditions better than before? Or they are more 372 
deprived? Do they have more bargaining power? Do they gain more job opportunities? Or they 373 
are more marginalised as a simple worker? How about their social welfare? To what extent the 374 
guest would offer and construct infrastructure/facilities for the host communities? Do local 375 
people have now an easier access to more and better foods? Are the foods cheaper than before? 376 
Do the local people produce and earn more than before? Do the local people have more access to 377 
market? How about the land price fluctuation in the host countries? How about the governance? 378 
What would be the position of the governance? 379 
Poor countries’ central governments usually have neither the capacity nor the local knowledge to 380 
implement a just, large-scale national land registration system (Clover and Eriksen, 2009). With 381 
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such a high proportion of land being unregistered, the risks of dispossession for the poor majority 382 
from a major land-grab are very high (Toulmin, 2008a). Most cultivable land is already used or 383 
claimed by local farmers, herders and gatherers with no formal documentation (Toulmin, 2008b). 384 
For instance, up to 90 percent of rural land is under customary tenure in Africa (Gerlach and Liu, 385 
2010). It is expected that local poor and vulnerable people displacement is the main negative 386 
social impacts of AO in this continent. Gender is critical to understanding the impact of land 387 
deals because ‘men and women have different social roles, rights, and opportunities and will be 388 
differentially affected by any major change in tenure, especially land transfers to foreign 389 
investors (White and White, 2012). The challenge is that these people have little access to the 390 
law and are excluded from formal land rights (Rudi et al., 2012). This problem would therefore 391 
worsen land tenure conflicts between the investors and local people. The investors would grab a 392 
part of the political, social and economic governance besides the land grabbing. From the 393 
governance point of view, land grabs violate the position of governance at all levels of human 394 
life: accountability, predictability, adherence to the rule of law, and human rights (Simo, 2011). 395 
It seems that to avoid this, the investors’ activities should be well organized by the governments 396 
of host countries (Daniel, 2012).  397 
The extent of the technology that must be or can be transferred from guest to host countries is 398 
essential since there would be some socio-economic, political and environmental side effects. 399 
For a green deal, indigenous people must contribute to the process of crop production and 400 
constructing infrastructures. The contribution of the local people is essential since by creation 401 
more jobs and income for men and women, it helps them absorb and accept needed technologies 402 
more eagerly (Behrman et al., 2011). Consequently, such conditions ameliorate people’s self-403 
confidence for successful food productions after the departure of investors. Consistently, it 404 
would be a green deal from social and political points of view. Also, the local people’s 405 
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contribution results in job creation and is important from both the social and economic aspects 406 
(Saturnino et al., 2010). However, the uneven development can be expected in different regions 407 
of the host countries, between where the investors’ technologies are imported and where are not. 408 
Such an uneven development may cause a socio-economic problem, mainly increasing gap 409 
between the rich and the poor. 410 
Some case studies observed that land deals projects are labour intensive during the initial 411 
phase but become increasingly mechanized later on, thus reducing future income opportunities 412 
(Gerlach and Liu, 2010). Nonetheless, it is expected that as a consequence of green deals, the 413 
host countries will be gained a more sustainable economic growth. Land and agricultural 414 
production have been highlighted as critical for economic growth and poverty reduction (Clover 415 
and Eriksen, 2009). As a consequence of technology transfer, infrastructures construction and 416 
capital flow from investors to investees, agricultural output and productivity will be increased. 417 
Additionally, employment creation upgrades domestic production (Hallam, 2009) and boosts the 418 
economic growth.   419 
As discussed earlier, a worrisome issue is that all the produced foods in host countries may be 420 
shipped to guest countries for their local consumptions. In this situation, poor people do not have 421 
access to enough food to survive and it may therefore exacerbate the poverty. To avoid such 422 
insecure situations where job creation and food security are threatened, investors should 423 
contribute to the local people’s food security as well. 424 
 425 
3.3. Environmental aspects 426 
Environmental impacts are also one of the main issues that need to be addressed when assessing 427 
the consequences of AO. Many of the land buyers, especially from arid and import dependent 428 
countries, are essentially seeking access to water as much as they buy land (Woodhouse and 429 
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Ganho, 2011) which is already referred to as “water grabbing”.  The problematic issue is that the 430 
volume of needed water for large-scale agricultural projects is not explicitly mentioned in many 431 
land deal contracts (Woodhouse, 2012). Thus, there is a need to assess available and required 432 
water for the specific period of each deal (Mehta et al., 2012).   433 
Since most of the investors buy or lease lands to feed their own nations, seemingly, they 434 
produce a few numbers of crops for several years. This may cause a significant loss in 435 
biodiversity due to the introduction of monoculture (Bazuin et al., 2011). Also, most likely, 436 
investors choose some types of agricultural systems to reach the higher yields especially in the 437 
short-run leases. For instance, most conservation tillage systems have lower outputs than the 438 
conventional ones (Coughenour and Chamala, 2000), but they are much more sustainable. 439 
Capital-intensive agricultural practices, typical of the current land acquisition, use large amounts 440 
of fresh water resources and depend heavily on fertilizers and pesticides (Spieldoch and Murphy 441 
2009). The investors will want a quick return. They will practice an industrial model of 442 
agriculture (Azadi et al., 2011c; Rudi et al., 2012) that in many parts of the world has already 443 
resulted in poverty, environmental destruction and farm-chemical pollution (Nayak, 2004). In 444 
this case, over use of pesticides and fertilizers can lead to soil and water contamination. 445 
Although purchase or long-run lease have more political and socio-economic effects on host 446 
countries, the environmental damage is more severe in short-run leases since investors may put a 447 
pressure on land and water resources to reach a higher yield as much as possible (Azadi et al., 448 
2011d). Consequently, there would be nothing for local communities at the end of the contracts. 449 
In fact, land and water grabs; due to investors’ recklessness and lack of control from host 450 
countries may lead to huge environmental problems in outsourcees. To avoid this situation, some 451 
sorts of crops and rotation schedules, agricultural and irrigation systems, the quantity and quality 452 
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of inputs, i.e. farm machines, fertilizers and pesticides should be clearly regulated before signing 453 
the deal. 454 
 455 
4. Conclusion 456 
This study showed that AO can be resulted in four different statuses, i.e. loss-loss, win-loss, loss-457 
win, and win-win. The first and the last deals are introduced as “red” and “green” deal since they 458 
result respectively in loss and gain for both the investor and investee. The two other deals are 459 
called “yellow” since one side gain much and the other less. The “red deals” are destructive and 460 
should be stopped because both sides gain nothing and would face unsustainable and insecure 461 
food production systems. The “yellow deals” should be modified in such a way that results in a 462 
“green” deal to profit both the investors and investees. To reach a beneficial “green deal”, 463 
political, governance, socio-economic and environmental effects of each deal should be studied. 464 
Since rights to land are a basis for social relationships and cultural values, and a source of 465 
prestige and often power and political status in developing countries, farmers’ land tenure rights 466 
must precede land deal negotiations. Furthermore, as a result of high proportion of unregistered 467 
land in poor countries, the risk of dispossession through a land grab for the majority of poor is 468 
very high. Indeed, only where poor people have secure land use rights, AO can actually offer a 469 
platform for development. Additionally, the duration and the size of investment (Hall, 2011) are 470 
critical factors that affect the future of the deals. It is also important to note that large size 471 
purchasing or long-run land leasing may be understood as a win-win “green deal” for the first 472 
years but due to the social dissatisfactions and probable riots, such deals may be realized 473 
unsustainable and would result in a “yellow” or “red” end.  474 
Unfortunately, the majority of host countries lack basic data on the size, nature, and the 475 
location of land acquisitions through land registries or other public sources (Cotula et al., 2009), 476 
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and that researchers needed to make multiple contacts to access even superficial and incomplete 477 
information. Also, many details of land deals are still hidden (FIAN, 2012) that inhibits a series 478 
of risk assessment studies to find what will happen and how will be the future of host countries. 479 
A challenging issue is that the losses in host countries would be much more severe than in the 480 
guests. Appropriately, the World Bank has launched some relevant studies on the basis of the 481 
projects that have been reported by the media and captured by the farmlandgrab organization8, 482 
LDPI9, ICAS10 and PLAAS11. The Bank’s most significant findings, however, are about the 483 
social impact assessment of these projects on local communities. Environmental impact 484 
assessments are rarely addressed, and people are routinely booted off their land, without 485 
consultation or compensation. For that reason, the host governments have to evaluate the 486 
consequences of deals very prudently. The political, socio-economic and most essentially 487 
environmental impacts of each deal must be studied continuously. The consideration of 488 
environmental effects are emphasized in the fact that most environmental losses like depleted 489 
and eroded water and soil resources are irreversible and could not be simply compensated. 490 
Particularly, the availability and needed water for a specific deal should carefully be investigated 491 
to prevent the “water grabbing” phenomenon. For all this, we still need to create more evidence 492 
for each of the situations, i.e. “red”, “yellow” and “green” deals by conducting more case studies 493 
in different regions. Most essentially, an “authorized continuous monitoring system” is needed to 494 
inspect the performance of the investors in host countries to come to a green deal. Such a system 495 
should help both the host and guest countries to make a “continuous” monitoring system on the 496 
consequences of the deals. Both the countries should therefore not be difficult to let third parties 497 
                                                          
8
 farmlandgrab organization, http://farmlandgrab.org/ 
9
 LDPI, http://www.iss.nl/research/networks_and_projects/land_deal_politics_ldpi/ 
10
 ICAS,http://www.iss.nl/research/networks_and_projects/critical_agrarian_studies_icas/  
11
 PLAAS, http://www.plaas.org.za/ 
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make an investigation on the consequences but also they should intentionally ask the third parties 498 
to make such investigations continuously. Accordingly, the monitoring system should formally 499 
be mentioned in the contract as an imperative article of the regulations. 500 
It should be emphasised that not in every poor country, AO can be practiced, because it can 501 
easily end to a “red” status. Therefore, we need a series of risk assessment studies on the bases of 502 
both “country-case” and “crop-case”. Such assessments should comprehensively address the 503 
“political”, “governance”, “socio-economic”, and “environmental” aspects of land deals. Given 504 
the long duration of land deal contracts, such assessments should be regarded incessantly both 505 
beforehand and when running the project while phasing out might never be the case.  506 
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